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I. Introduction: 2016 
The election of Donald J. Trump to the presidency of the United States marks a 
key shift in the state of national politics. For rightwing enthusiasts, his election represents 
a triumph over rampant political correctness and the elitist political establishment of 
Washington, DC. For leftwing opponents, it signifies the disturbing normalization of a 
fascist discourse at the highest level of mainstream politics. In the aftermath of perhaps 
one of the most contentious elections in US history, those on the left side of the aisle find 
themselves counting their losses and evaluating the stakes of their defeat, desperately 
sifting through the slew of pledges amassed during Trump’s lengthy seventeen-month 
campaign. Some of the centerpieces of Trump’s campaign to “Make America Great 
Again” that launched the president-elect into political stardom among persuaded 
Americans included the deportation of eleven million undocumented immigrants to 
Mexico, the construction of a wall spanning the entire length of the US-Mexico border, 
the temporary ban of Muslims from entering the country, and the federal defunding of 
Planned Parenthood. Conversely, his polarizing platform touched a nerve among 
minorities across the spectrum and their political supporters, serving to rally those 
disenchanted voters against his divisive message.  
As a Republican presidential candidate, Trump made a historical appeal to the 
LGBTQ electorate. Despite his concerted efforts to court the LGBTQ vote, data collected 
from exit polls reveals that LGBTQ voters were the only major demographic whose 
opposition to the Republican candidate in 2016 has actually increased since the re-
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election of Barack Obama in 2012.1 To be fair, it is no surprise that proponents of 
LGBTQ rights failed to turn out in droves in favor of a Trump presidency. They protested 
his vice-presidential pick, Mike Pence—the Indiana governor notorious for opposing 
same-sex marriage, advancing “religious liberty” legislation that would sanction 
discrimination against LGBTQ folks, and promoting conversion therapy for LGBTQ 
minors throughout his state. Furthermore, there was deep worry over the possibility of 
Trump appointing Supreme Court justices who would attempt to gut same-sex marriage. 
Without delegitimizing the threat that these factors pose to mainstream LGBTQ politics, I 
focus my attention on the more unusual “pro-LGBTQ” efforts that defined key moments 
of Trump’s campaign.  
Just days before the election in November, Trump was seen parading a rainbow 
flag on stage at a Colorado campaign rally. However, it was in July 2016 during the 
Republican National Convention that Trump’s apparently “pro-gay” position became 
definitively grounded in his campaign platform. Peter Thiel—billionaire tech investor, 
founder of PayPal, and openly gay man—spoke out in support of Trump, proclaiming, “I 
am proud to be gay. I am proud of be a Republican. But most of all I am proud to be an 
American,” signaling the first time an openly gay person has taken the stage at the 
Convention.2 When Trump himself came around to the podium on the final night of the 
Convention, he made a startling appeal to the LGBTQ community. Highlighting the 
“Islamic terrorist” attack at Pulse nightclub in Orlando on June 12, 2016, Trump stated, 
“As your President, I will do everything in my power to protect LGBTQ citizens from the 
                                                        
1 "LGBT Voters Came out Strong for Hillary, Dumped Trump in Historic 
Numbers." AMERICAblog News. N.p., 15 Nov. 2016. Web. 
2 "Why Peter Thiel's Speech at the GOP Convention Matters." Time. Time, n.d. Web. 
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violence and oppression of a hateful foreign ideology.”3 As a lesbian viewing the 
broadcast in real time, I was speechless; not only was his message a stark departure from 
the explicitly anti-gay platform that the Republican Party has embraced for years,4 but it 
also signaled Trump’s attempt to pit LGBTQ folks against Muslims (falsely assuming the 
mutual exclusivity of the two groups). To top it all off, the Republican-packed arena 
frantically cheered and chanted “USA” in response to Trump’s promise to protect 
LGBTQ citizens from Islamic terrorism, to which Trump himself expressed 
astonishment.5 These bizarre moments in present-day American politics have left me 
desperately searching for answers: what ideological objective is served by Trump’s 
promotion of the LGBTQ community as a class of citizens, worthy of protection from 
Islamic terrorism? What events in recent history might explain this significant shift in 
Republican campaign strategy towards a favorable (if only rhetorically) treatment of the 
LGBTQ community?  
The answer, as I will argue throughout this paper, has much to do with same-sex 
marriage and the US nation-building project. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court 
publicly announced its landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 6 effectively legalizing 
same-sex marriage throughout the US. Aside from offering state-sanctioned marriage and 
                                                        
3 Donald J. Trump/G4ViralVideos. “Donald Trump Promises to Protect the LGBTQ 
Community.” Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 22 July 2016. Web. 26 September 
2016.  
4 See GOP’s 2016 platform: "The 2016 Republican Party Platform." GOP. N.p., 18 July 2016. 
Web. 
5 In response to the crowd’s cheers, Trump states, “And I have to say, as a Republican it is so nice 
to hear you cheering for what I just said. Thank you.” Donald J. Trump/G4ViralVideos. 
“Donald Trump Promises to Protect the LGBTQ Community.” Online video clip. 
YouTube. Youtube, 22 July 2016. Web. 26 September 2016. 
6 See Obergefell v. Hodges. United States Supreme Court. 26 June 2015. Print.  
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its material benefits7 to same-sex couples across the nation for the first time, the ruling 
created new inroads for certain groups of queer folks8 in accessing full-fledged 
citizenship and partaking in the nation-building project. Utilizing the mass shooting at 
Pulse nightclub and its aftermath as temporal indicators of shifting political attitudes 
around LGBTQ rights, I argue that since Obergefell, the respectability9 newly available 
to queer folks (specifically those who participate or aspire to participate in traditional 
marriage and family-building) is responsible for creating a new class of “good queers” 
worthy of protection from “bad Muslims.” In other words, beyond enabling certain queer 
folks to reap the legal and social benefits afforded to “good citizens,” the legalization of 
same-sex marriage has also assisted in reifying a new strategic incentive for the 
continuation of the War on Terror: that is the state’s investment in protecting its good 
                                                        
7 The material benefits and responsibilities afforded to married couples by the government 
include “taxation; inheritance and property rights, rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege 
in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decision making authority; adoption rights; the 
rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional and ethics rules, 
campaign finance restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child 
custody, support and visitation rules.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).  
8 The term “queer” has been the subject of extensive debate both within and outside lesbian, gay 
bisexual, transgender, queer (LGBTQ) communities and their respective discourses. I do not 
simply reject the critical negotiations over this term that such scholars like Cathy J. Cohen have 
engaged in, including her extension of the term “queer” to apply to certain racialized heterosexual 
individuals; rather, in acknowledgment of the rhetorical limitations within the discourse of 
sexuality, I assert my usage of “queer” throughout this paper as a means of capturing all folks 
whose sexualities reside outside of conventional understandings of heterosexual conduct (that is 
sex between two cisgender individuals of the opposite sex), as opposed to the commonly 
deployed lesbian, gay, bisexual (LGB) classification, which inherently excludes two larger 
groups: 1) those individuals who engage in non-heterosexual sex who reject assigning themselves 
to the above-mentioned LGB categories, and 2) trans individuals who engage in heterosexual sex 
but whose trans identity may forbid the state’s recognition of it as such.  
9 Throughout this paper I utilize the term “respectability” to describe the state’s attitude towards 
queer folks whose aspirations and life choices adhere to its idea of proper citizenship 
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queers from “Islamic terrorism” and, more specifically, those bad Muslims who aspire to 
kill them.10    
Throughout this paper, I will grapple with the major debates that have dominated 
the discourse around same-sex marriage—utilizing the conservative view offered in 
Lawrence v. Texas,11 the liberal view in Obergefell, and foundational leftist anti-marriage 
theories as the primary objects of my analysis—and give weight to the ways in which the 
state’s administration of social and legal rewards (as made available through the 
institution of marriage) has necessarily been shaped by its preferences for whiteness and 
the traditional nuclear family. Taking into account the arguments that ultimately 
succeeded in achieving marriage equality, I will go on to situate these winning logics in 
the framework of US counterterror strategies and expose how the state’s production of 
good queers worthy of protection is currently being deployed for the purposes of 
bolstering support for the War on Terror,12 as evidenced by Donald Trump’s comments at 
the Republican National Convention. Ultimately, I aim to highlight the mechanisms by 
which the state’s construction of good queers helps legitimize the hyper-surveillance and 
sustained targeting of Muslims as a disposable class of “terrorists” in the name of 
national security.  
 
II. The Path to Protection: A Queer’s Journey into the Heart of the 
Nation-State 
 
                                                        
10 Later in this paper I will discuss other ways in which the construction of the “good queer” has 
served to marginalize other groups—in addition to Muslims—not traditionally defined by their 
sexuality, such as low-income women of color. 
11 Lawrence v. Texas. United States Supreme Court. 26 June 2003. Print.  
12 Although Trump characterizes the war as against “Radical Islamic Terrorism” instead of as the 
“War on Terror” (originally coined by President George W. Bush on September 20, 2001), I 
utilize the latter term to emphasize the continuity of the war initiated in 2001 and its targets. 
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Although the battle over marriage equality has been a dominant fixture of political 
discourse in recent years, it was not until the early 1990s that the same-sex marriage 
agenda materialized as a bona fide political campaign. Scholars posit that some members 
of the LGBTQ community pursued marriage equality with new fervor as a response to 
the AIDS crisis, during which challenges to hospital visitation, surrogate medical 
decision-making, and property inheritance exposed the stark injustices many experienced 
due to their unmarried status.13 Others suggest that the intensified push for marriage 
equality paralleled organized efforts to combat additional problems emerging against the 
LGBTQ community, such as President Clinton’s authorization of “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” (1992) and the “Defense of Marriage Act” (1993)14—both of which codified the 
illegality of homosexuality in unprecedented ways.15 While some queer folks were for the 
first time organizing the fight for same-sex marriage, the legality of queer sexuality was 
still unsettled and pending review by the Supreme Court. It was only in 2003 that the 
Supreme Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)16 and ruled in favor of petitioners 
in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), declaring Texas’ anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional and 
effectively legalizing the practice of “private” homosexual sex across the nation. Indeed, 
the logics produced by the courts during this period of sodomy decriminalization have 
                                                        
13 Klarman, Michael J. "How Same-sex Marriage Came to Be." Harvard Law Today. N.p., n.d. 
Web. 
14 Although Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT)—recognizing the inclusion of LGB people in the 
military—and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)—defining marriage as between a man and a 
woman—differed in their fundamental treatment of queer folks (DADT being understood as an 
extension of rights and DOMA as a restriction), both pieces of legislation made queerness 
explicitly a legal subject in unprecedented ways in the US.   
15 Warner, Michael. The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2003. Print. 
16 In Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the Supreme Court held that states were within their rights to 
impose bans on sodomy.  
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contributed substantially to the contents of the debates over same-sex marriage, as 
evidenced by the justices’ written opinions and their explicit references to Bowers and 
Lawrence in defending their respective points. As such, it cannot be dismissed that the 
rationales supporting the decriminalization of sodomy in 2003 have necessarily informed 
the Court’s authorization of same-sex marriage in 2015. 
 
A. The Conservative Slant 
The arguments that constitute Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence 
expose the logics that have driven mainstream conservative political discourse and its 
unapologetic promotion of legal regulation of deviant sexualities. In admonishing the 
Court for overturning Bowers, which legitimized a state’s ability to criminalize sodomy, 
Scalia writes, “State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, 
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only 
in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices.”17 Scalia and like-minded 
conservative-thinkers subscribe to the notion that the legitimacy of the state’s regulation 
of sexuality is located in its ability to distinguish between what is moral and what is 
immoral. However, by situating his support for the state’s regulation of sodomy among a 
slew of other non-normative sexual behaviors deemed collectively “immoral,” Scalia not 
only reaffirms these behaviors’ shared immorality relative to heteronormative18 principles 
but also makes available a more fundamental critique of the state’s regulation of sexuality 
as it functions in relation to moral judgments—that the state dangerously overextends 
                                                        
17 Lawrence v. Texas. United States Supreme Court. 26 June 2003. Print. 
18 I use “heteronormative” to describe the process by which authoritative heterosexual notions of 
proper interpersonal and sexual conduct are standardized and embedded in mainstream social 
discourse.  
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itself into the intimate lives of private individuals when it attempts to referee proper 
sexuality in the first place. His dissent thus accurately predicts some of the chief logics 
that would drive the Court’s eventual adjudication of same-sex marriage and 
simultaneously exposes the state’s long-standing practice of regulating sexuality 
according to normative moral judgments.  
 
B. The Liberal Slant 
Interestingly the language of morality is entirely abandoned among the 
conservative justices’ dissenting opinions in Obergefell. Whereas the substance of their 
dissents focuses on the alleged overreach of the courts in creating policy in lieu of 
conventional democratic procedures, it is the liberal branch of the Court that embraces 
the language of morality and dignity (as made available by conservative dissenters in 
Lawrence) in order to fashion its defense of same-sex marriage. While this language 
certainly percolates through the entire Obergefell majority opinion, Justice Robert 
Kennedy’s conclusion paragraph remains perhaps the single most widely cited segment 
among misty-eyed liberals who bask in the language of the Court’s ruling. As such, it 
deserves its own focused evaluation. Kennedy famously writes the following: 
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, 
fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become 
something greater than once they were. As some of the petitions in these cases 
demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would 
misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their 
plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for 
themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of 
civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The 
Constitution grants them that right.19 
 
                                                        
19 See Obergefell v. Hodges. 28. United States Supreme Court. 26 June 2015. Print. 
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The conclusion paragraph serves as a vehicle through which the court—as an executor of 
state power—makes normative a particular set of assumed “shared aspirations” and 
disseminates them to the American people, queer and otherwise. Kennedy reiterates the 
significance of marriage as an embodiment of our “highest ideals of love, fidelity, 
devotion, sacrifice, and family.” This family-centric position is a shared ideal among 
liberals and conservatives alike, returning to the long-held reverence for the nuclear 
family as a reflection of the nation-state’s most deeply held values.20 Indeed, this 
characterization of the family as an embodiment of American values has been 
rearticulated by Supreme Court justices countless times with respect to an array of legal 
issues extending beyond the scope of marriage and family.21 This veneration of family 
saturates Kennedy’s defense of same-sex marriage in Obergefell, which is further 
evidenced by his adamant defense of the petitioners on the basis of their deep respect for 
the institution of marriage. Kennedy proposes that “it would misunderstand these men 
and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage”—a presumable response to 
rightwing opponents—and offers “that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they 
seek to find its fulfillment for themselves.” The language Kennedy deploys here is 
significant in that it reveals two key factors underlying the Court’s decision: the 
successful defense of same-sex marriage is located in the liberal justices’ joint 
                                                        
20 Berlant, Lauren Gail. The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and 
Citizenship. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1997. Print. 
21 See Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), in which the Court found it pertinent to emphasize the 
importance of family in relation to a state law prohibiting schools from teaching foreign 
languages to students below the eighth grade; In deeming the law unconstitutional, 
Justice McReynolds delivers the opinion of the Court, writing, “[The freedoms 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment denote] the right of the individual to contract, 
to engage in any of the common occupations of life… to marry, establish a home and 
bring up children… and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized by common 
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Meyer v. Nebraska. 
United States Supreme Court. 4 June 1923. Print.  
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appreciation for the queer petitioners’ “deep respect for marriage” as well as the justices’ 
collective disavowal and implicit denunciation of marriage-abstainers. As such, it 
becomes clear that the designation of marriage rights to same-sex couples is premised on 
queer folks’ assumed respect for the institution and all it implies. Conversely, those who 
presumably “disrespect marriage” are relegated to a lesser status.  
In the final moments of delivering the majority opinion, Kennedy makes a 
remarkable departure from the conventional debate over the right to marriage and its 
corresponding benefits. Situated in the haze of Constitutionalized fantasies and romantic 
reflections on civil liberties and “the pursuit of happiness,” there is a cagey shift in which 
the Court’s rhetoric of marriage rights expands to include a new and ostensibly discrete 
“right”: the right to dignity.22 In closing his statements, Kennedy writes, “[The queer 
petitioners] ask for equal dignity under the law. The Constitution grants them that right,” 
effectively fortifying the inextricable link between marriage and dignity. Delivering 
queer folks from a “condemned life of loneliness,” Kennedy offers the gift of marriage as 
a path to the acquisition of dignity. Consequently, Kennedy’s defense of same-sex 
marriage is intimately tied to assumptions about the dignity that marriage confers upon its 
subjects in general, regardless of sexual orientation. As such, the resonations of this 
ruling are felt across the general public indiscriminately, including (perhaps 
unexpectedly) unmarried individuals belonging to groups whose identities fall outside the 
                                                        
22 According to Neomi Rao, the form of “dignity” that is conferred upon same-sex couples 
through marriage is defined by the social and political recognition that the institution 
makes available: “dignity does not necessarily turn on tangible rights or freedoms. Strict 
equality of legal benefits are viewed as inadequate standing alone, because dignity as 
recognition depends essentially on how one’s choices and relationships are viewed by the 
broader social and political community, by the attitude expressed about one’s 
relationships by the law.” Rao, Neomi. “Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional 
Law.” Notre Dame Law Review 86.1 (2011): 183-271. Web. 
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conventionally understood category of queer. While purporting to further a new equality 
(the equal right to marriage for homosexual and heterosexual couples alike), Obergefell 
may also be understood as a legal catalyst for the reinforcement of a deeply entrenched 
social inequality with roots well-documented in U.S. history: the inequality of unmarried 
folks against the married.23 Although an already well-established pillar of social 
convention, the inequality of unmarried folks in relation to their married counterparts 
becomes reinvigorated by the Obergefell decision and its explicit assignment of dignity to 
those who marry. As such, the results of these judicial logics are far more widespread 
than may be immediately apparent.  
 
C. The Injustice of Marriage 
Though framed as an extension of rights to queer folks, the Obergefell ruling is 
nothing short of a blatant message to the American people as a whole—a message that 
indeed carries with it an array of material benefits to those who comply with the Court’s 
valuation of marriage and punitive actions against those who deviate. It is a message 
whose origins in the US can be traced back to the inception of the nation-state itself, and 
it has been reiterated in compliance with evolving socio-political contexts, most of which 
have necessarily involved race and debates over extending equal rights to black folks. 
During the “slavery era,”24 black folks were forbidden from accessing citizenship and its 
material benefits—including the right to enter into contracts such as marriage—on the 
                                                        
23 Murray, Melissa. "Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality." California Law 
Review 104.5 (2016): 1207-258. Academic Search Premier. Web. 4 Nov. 2016. 
24 The notion that state-sanctioned slavery no longer exists in the US remains contestable in 
relation to the prevalent conditions of mass-incarceration and forced labor; however, I refer here 
to the colonial period through 1865, marking the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment 
effectively abolishing chattel slavery. 
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basis of their assumed inequality to whites.25 In the years following the passage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the effective abolition of chattel slavery in 1865, efforts to 
preserve the integrity of marriage and white racial purity26 manifested in anti-
miscegenation laws prohibiting interracial marriage and sex.27 It was only during Loving 
v. Virginia (1967) that the Court overturned these anti-miscegenation laws and cemented 
marriage as a “fundamental right” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause. Indeed, there are striking parallels to be made in comparing the reverence for 
marriage that was used to legitimize the prohibition of interracial marriage through the 
1960s and the present-day extension of marriage equality to same-sex couples. In his 
defense of Virginia’s anti-miscegenation laws in Loving, Assistant Attorney General R.D. 
McIlwaine III presents miscegenation as a threat to marriage—an institution “[having] 
more to do with a welfare and civilization of the people than any other institution.”28 He 
goes on to characterize interracial spouses as possessing “a rebellious attitude towards 
society, self-hatred, neurotic tendencies, immaturity, and other detrimental psychological 
factors,” from whom child “victims” and “martyrs” are born.29 Although serving to 
further ostensibly different legal goals, McIlwaine’s and Kennedy’s arguments converge 
in their adoration and ardent protection of marriage; whereas the passionate and 
sentimental defense of marriage in Obergefell is understood to have brought about 
                                                        
25 See Dred Scott v. Sanford majority opinion: Dred Scott v. Sandford. United States Supreme 
Court. 6 Mar. 1857. Print. 
26 Cohen, Cathy J. "Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens." GLQ 3 (1997): 437-65. Web. 
27 Oh, Reginald. "Interracial Marriage in the Shadows of Jim Crow: Racial Segregation as a 
System of Racial and Gender Subordination." U.C. Davis Law Review 39 (2006): n. pag. 
Web. 
28 "Excerpts from a Transcript of Oral Arguments in Loving v. Virginia (April 10, 1967)." N.p., 
n.d. Web. 
29 In his majority opinion in Obergefell, Kennedy invokes a similar child-based justification for 
upholding marriage: “Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their 
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”  
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“justice” for queer folks, that same defense has been a critical element in maintaining the 
oppression and subordination of racial minorities—particularly black folks—throughout 
US history.  
Taking into account the plethora of ways in which this history of the courts’ 
veneration of marriage has remained intimately intertwined with systemic racial 
inequality in the US, the correlation between marriage and injustice must be situated 
front-and-center in the context of its extension to same-sex couples. All-too-absent from 
the mainstream debate over marriage equality is the leftist position that rejects the 
institution altogether precisely because of the injustices it introduces and perpetuates. As 
queer theorist Michael Warner keenly points out in his famous anti-marriage manifesto 
“Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage,” “Squeezing gay couples into the legal 
sorting machine will only confirm the relevance of spousal status and leave unmarried 
queers looking more deviant before a legal system that can claim broader legitimacy.”30 
The impenetrable layer of sentimentalism that blankets the conventional liberal sermon in 
favor of same-sex marriage muddies the water for a more pointed interrogation of the 
institution of marriage as a whole (including the inherent harms it poses for unmarried 
queer and heterosexual folks alike). Pitched as threats to the beloved institution of 
marriage, “adulterers, prostitutes, divorcees, the promiscuous, single people, unwed 
parents, and those below the age of consent” find themselves the inadvertent adversaries 
of the crusade for marriage, according to Cathy J. Cohen. 31 Indeed, so too do 
heterosexual women of color on welfare—already deemed sexually immoral and 
                                                        
30 See Warner, Michael. "On Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage." The Free 
Press (1999): 123-43. Web. 
31 See Cohen, Cathy J. "Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer 
Politics?" GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies. 01 Jan. 1997. Web.  
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unworthy of state support—suffer from the increased scrutiny and marginalization that 
accompanies intensified efforts to promote the importance of marriage. As such, the 
discourse around marriage equality must not be reduced to romanticized notions of rights 
and upward mobility for certain queer folks when such an approach erases the de facto 
harms produced by the institution itself: the further marginalization of numerous 
racialized and classed groups already relegated to the extreme fringes of the nation-state.  
 
D. Marriage and Nation-Building 
By now, the personal benefits afforded to queer folks wielding their marriage 
rights (as well as the corresponding problems of the institution altogether) should be well 
established. It is important that the Obergefell decision not be interpreted merely as a sort 
of rights-allocation to a traditionally marginalized group but as a crucial element in the 
furtherance of the United States’ enduring quest for nation-building and nationalism. 
Benedict Anderson’s theoretical conception of the nation as “an imagined community”—
whose collective identity and purpose are located in its fantasy of shared values and other 
points of alleged mutual identification—stands as a salient approach for understanding 
the state’s incentive for granting marriage rights to same-sex couples.32 In The Queen of 
America Goes to Washington City, Lauren Berlant situates her analysis of present-day 
identity politics around the notion of “citizen trauma” in order to explain the United 
States’ investment in revamping its nation-building efforts within the twenty-first 
century. Identifying some of the major drivers of widespread national insecurity as of 
recent, she writes, “The crisis of national future, stimulated by sexual politics, comes at a 
time when America feels unsure about its value on a number of domains: in world 
                                                        
32 See Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1991. Print. 
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military politics, in global economics, in ecological practice, and in the claim that the 
nation has a commitment to sustaining justice, democracy, and the American Dream 
when there seems to be less money and reliable work to go around.”33 In identifying 
some of the underlying issues that continue to challenge possibilities for US nationhood, 
Berlant highlights the incentives driving the nation-state’s commitment to curing its 
suffering sense of self.  
Our nation’s leaders naturally emerge as some of our most sacred keepers in 
furthering this project to repair the nation. Accordingly, the illusion of absorbing certain 
queer folks into the nation-state presents itself as central to the Supreme Court’s 
legalization of same-sex marriage. Kennedy’s remarks in Obergefell expose the extent to 
which marriage bestows queer subjects access to citizenship34 and national belonging. He 
writes the following: 
[T]he Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of 
the Nation’s social order …When the American retires from the turmoil of public life to 
the bosom of the family, he finds in it the image of order and peace… [H]e afterwards 
carries [that image] with him into public affairs … For that reason, just as a couple vows 
to support each other, so does society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic 
recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union.35 
 
Most noteworthy here is Kennedy’s rumination on the symbiotic relationship between 
married couple and nation. His fantasy entails a social order in which spouses support 
each other, and in turn the nation offers “symbolic recognition and material benefits to 
protect and nourish the union.” Kennedy’s articulation of the linkage of marriage to 
                                                        
33 See Berlant, Lauren. The Queen of America Goes to Washington City Essays on Sex and 
Citizenship. Durham: Duke UP, 2012. 18. Print. 
34 I refer here to Zareena Grewal’s notion of “social citizenship”—as distinct from “legal 
citizenship”—from which certain citizens are granted the social capital that enables them 
to participate freely in the imagined nation; see Grewal, Zareena. Islam is a Foreign 
Country: American Muslims and the Global Crisis of Authority. New York: New York 
UP, 2014. Print.  
35 Obergefell v. Hodges. 16. United States Supreme Court. 26 June 2015. Print. 
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nation is not without cause; indeed, it is a strategic and authoritative decree effectively 
permitting—if not insisting on—the good queer’s entry into the nation-state. Riding on 
the coattails of established US ideology that has sought to define the nation by its 
commitments and rules to marriage, Obergefell serves as the effective culmination of a 
political progression in which the nation-state becomes reimagined as belonging to the 
good queer, too. As I display in the sections to follow, the bestowment of dignity and 
social citizenship onto the good queer through these judicial proceedings will eventually 
lend itself to the rhetorical premises supporting Trump’s warmongering presidential 
agenda.   
 
III. A Queer’s Right to Marriage is the Nation’s Right to War: 
Reimagining the Nation’s Role in the War on Terror 
 
“Only weeks ago in Orlando, Florida, 49 wonderful Americans were savagely murdered 
by an Islamic terrorist. This time the terrorist targeted the LGBTQ community… As your 
president, I will do everything in my power to protect our LGBTQ citizens from the 
violence and oppression of a hateful, foreign ideology… And I have to say, as a 
Republican, it is so nice to hear you cheering for what I just said.” 
—Donald J. Trump, Republican National Convention, July 21, 201636 
 
The concurrent progressions of the crusade for marriage equality and the War on 
Terror are not an accident. Indeed, in peculiar ways the two campaigns have functioned 
in tandem, with each defining and driving the basis for the other. Following the attacks 
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11, the nation found itself extensively 
reimagining who it was and the nature of the threats lodged against it.37 Accordingly, 
while June 26, 2015 may be understood as the culmination of the good queer’s absorption 
                                                        
36 Donald J. Trump/G4ViralVideos. “Donald Trump Promises to Protect the LGBTQ 
Community.” Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 22 July 2016. Web. 26 September 
2016. 
37 See Masco, Joseph. The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold War to 
the War on Terror. Durham: Duke UP, 2014. 15. Print. 
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into the image of the nation-state,38 we may also view September 11, 2001 as the 
commencement of a colossal campaign to define and obliterate public enemy number 
one—the bad Muslim, the terrorist.39 Donald Trump’s recent pledge to “protect our 
LGBTQ citizens from the violence and oppression of a hateful, foreign ideology”—
Islam, to be explicit—signals a key turning point in the War on Terror and the socio-
political conditions that sustain it. For the first time in mainstream US politics, we see 
bipartisanship around a particular kind of “queer rights”–albeit hawkish by nature and 
premised on the eradication of Muslim bodies in “defense” of certain queer ones.  
For the remainder of this paper, I argue that the legalization of same-sex marriage 
and the continuation of the War on Terror are inherently linked in producing this fairly 
new brand of mainstream queer politics. I do so by exposing the particular ways in which 
the defensibility of the good queer—as promoted by liberals, Donald Trump, and other 
likeminded Republican leaders40—is contingent upon the construction of the bad Muslim 
as savage, religiously zealous, morally devoid, sexually deviant and racially other. 
Furthermore, I situate this analysis within the broader discourse of “American 
exceptionalism”41—a concept that relies heavily on a belief in the United States as 
                                                        
38 I use “the image of the nation-state” because this paper does not aim to prove the good queer’s 
de facto immersion into the nation-state but rather the theoretical and rhetorical elements that 
have sought to place the good queer in the imagined conception of the nation-state. 
39 I do not suggest that the nation-state’s construction of the Muslim other definitively started on 
9/11 (indeed, the othering of the Muslim is part of a long tradition in the West dating back to the 
Spanish Inquisition and has reappeared in various temporal waves); rather, I highlight this 
moment in order to mark the start of the War on Terror as the official activation of an enormous 
apparatus seeking to define, target, and destroy the state’s purported enemies.  
40 See Paul Ryan’s post-Orlando comments: Johnson, Chris. "Republicans Recognize LGBT 
Massacre Victims, but Mum on Rights." Washington Blade: Gay News, Politics, LGBT 
Rights. N.p., 22 June 2016. Web.  
41 In Terrorist Assemblages, Jasbir K. Puar notes, “exceptionalism gestures to narratives of 
excellence, excellent nationalism, a process whereby a national population comes to 
believe in its own superiority and its own singularity”: Puar, Jasbir K. Terrorist 
Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer times. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2008. 5. Print. 
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superior (morally or otherwise) in order to legitimize enduring modes of intervention 
throughout the Middle East, be it under the pretense of “humanitarian aid” or flat out war. 
By tracing some of the key moments that have defined the nation-state’s investment in 
the War on Terror, I aim to reveal the critical role that the fluidity of the US nation-state’s 
morality politics has played in maintaining efforts to target Muslims and prolonging what 
has already been the most drawn-out war in US history.   
 
E. Defining the Muslim Threat to the Queer and the Nation 
 
The seemingly abrupt arrival of the good queer as a defensible citizen must not 
merely be understood as an isolated phenomenon but as part of a larger project to 
systemically filter and weed out adversaries of the nation-state. Just as unwed queer 
folks, prostitutes, and heterosexual women of color on welfare, for example, emerge all 
the more deviant against their newly “legalized” queer-marrying counterparts, so too does 
the Muslim body become the object of intensified surveillance, discipline, and 
punishment at home and abroad. In Terrorist Assemblages, Jasbir K. Puar coins the term 
“homonationalism” to describe the process by which the emergence of a “pro-gay” 
national discourse supports the nation-state’s mission to other and target suspect Muslim 
bodies; she writes, “For contemporary forms of U.S. nationalism and patriotism, the 
production of gay and queer bodies is crucial to the deployment of nationalism, insofar as 
these perverse bodies reiterate heterosexuality as the norm but also because certain 
domesticated homosexual bodies provide ammunition to reinforce nationalist projects.”42 
Indeed, her reference to “certain domesticated homosexual bodies [that] provide 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
42 Puar, Jasbir K. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer times. Durham, NC: Duke 
UP, 2008. 39. Print. 
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ammunition to reinforce nationalist projects” concerns those good queers whose 
acquiescence to marriage and other expressions of normative sexuality guarantees their 
passage into the nation-state, imagined or otherwise. The domestication of the queer thus 
becomes crucial to the process by which the nation-state reimagines who it is and, 
conversely, who it is not. Accordingly, the good queer is deployed not only as a 
mouthpiece for the nation’s principles but also as a weapon43 against the nation’s primary 
adversary—the Muslim terrorist—from whom the good queer is definitively 
distinguished.   
Indeed, the legalization of same-sex marriage throughout the Western world has 
proven integral to the production of this queer-versus-Muslim mythology. Referring to 
the nature of these ideological forces prior to the Obergefell ruling in 2015, Puar writes 
the following:  
Gay marriage, ‘less about gay rights and more about codifying European values,’ has 
become a steep but necessary insurance premium in Europe, whereby an otherwise 
ambivalent if not hostile populace can guarantee that extra bit of security that is bought 
by yet another marker in this distance between barbarism and civilization, one that 
justifies further targeting of a perversely sexualized and racialized Muslim population 
(pedophilic, sexually lascivious, and excessive, yet perversely repressed) who refuse to 
properly assimilate, in contrast to the upright homosexuals engaged in sanctioned kinship 
norms… Among other groups, OutRage!44 is codifying, for Europeans but also implicitly 
for Americans, that Muslims are an especial threat to homosexuals, that Muslim 
fundamentalists have deliberately and specifically targeted homosexuals, and that the 
parameters of this opposition correlate with those of the war on terror: civilization versus 
barbarism.45  
  
Touted as an indicator of the West’s civilizational prowess, the recent emergence of 
same-sex marriage proves remarkably convenient as a cogwheel in the West’s ever-
                                                        
43 By invoking “weapon,” I do so both figuratively (as in the good queer’s rhetorical 
defensibility) and literally (taking into account the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in 2010 and 
the effective inclusion and recognition of LGB military service members).  
44 OutRage! is a British-based LGBTQ organization 
45 Puar, Jasbir K. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer times. Durham, NC: Duke 
UP, 2008. 20. Print. 
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evolving War-on-Terror story. Interestingly, today’s Republican leaders who promote the 
protection of LGBTQ folks against “Islamic terror” also sought to constitutionally ban 
same-sex marriage and adoption by same-sex couples not long ago (in 1999, in Paul 
Ryan’s case).46 The present-day promotion of queer-defensibility relies heavily on long-
standing constructions of the Middle East as breeding-grounds for bloodthirsty zealots 
and of Muslims as racialized, sexualized, barbarous subjects. The racialization of 
Muslims is aided by a confluence of factors; indeed, numerous physical identifiers—such 
as dress, behavior, and phenotypic expressions—become legible to Westerners only 
through traditional Orientalist translations47 and present-day efforts to group Muslims 
according to essentialized tropes—the infidel savage, slave/captive, terrorist, and 
immigrant.48 These hegemonic characterizations of Muslims thus undergird the rhetorical 
foundations of the War on Terror and a western investment in promoting its civil 
values—including domesticated queerness—against the purported savagery and 
intolerance of the Muslim world.  
 Indeed, the West’s commitment to imagining and developing this queer-versus-
Muslim discourse may be read as a crucial element in the furtherance of American-
exceptionalism mythologies and parallel calls to war. Describing the fundamentally 
ironic conditions of “American exceptionalism,” Jasbir Puar writes, “the United States 
creates the impression that empire is beyond the pale of it own morally upright behavior, 
such that all violences of the state are seen, in some moral cultural, or political fashion as 
anything but the violence of empire. U.S. exceptionalism hangs on a narrative of 
                                                        
46 Ring, Trudy. "As House Speaker, Paul Ryan Will Be as Antigay as John 
Boehner." ADVOCATE. N.p., 20 Oct. 2015. Web.  
47 Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979. Print. 
48 Rana, Junaid Akram. Terrifying Muslims: Race and Labor in the South Asian Diaspora. 
Durham: Duke UP, 2011. 29. Print. 
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transcendence…that posits America as the arbiter of appropriate ethics, human rights, 
and democratic behavior while exempting itself without hesitation from such 
universalizing mandates.”49 Coincidentally, the ferocity of American-exceptionalism 
rhetoric and the nation-state’s aggressive claims to moral superiority enable US 
militarism and other intervention methods to deceitfully enact the very “savage” 
conditions it allegedly seek to eliminate throughout the Muslim world. As such, the 
mainstreaming of homonationalism and particular notions of “queer rights” opportunely 
accommodates long-standing narratives of American exceptionalism and corresponding 
efforts to monitor, regulate, and enforce bloodshed across the Muslim world under the 
guise of moral-politicking.  
 
F. Practicing Exceptionalism in the Middle East 
  
Although fairly recent in the scheme of American exceptionalism, the promotion 
of queer-defensibility as a justification for warfare against Muslims is not unprecedented 
on the global stage. Dubbed “pinkwashing” by queer and trans activists, efforts by the 
Israeli government to brand Israel as “gay friendly”50 in contrast to its “homophobic” 
Palestinian neighbors have proven central to Israeli military practices and public 
relations. This discourse hinges on furthering the notion of “Israeli exceptionalism” in its 
tolerance of homosexuality in order to deflect interrogative arguments concerning 
occupation, settler colonialism, and apartheid and to legitimize its brutal military efforts 
in the Palestinian territories. Highlighting the methods by which pinkwashing raises 
Israel as “civilized” and racializes Palestinians as “barbaric, homophobic, uncivilized, 
                                                        
49 Puar, Jasbir K. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer times. Durham, NC: Duke 
UP, 2008. 8. Print. 
50 It is important to note that Israel does not permit same-sex marriage but relies on vague notions 
of “gay friendliness” and the promotion of LGBTQ tourism in order to advance this image.   
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suicide-bombing fanatics,” Puar writes, “In reproducing orientalist tropes of Palestinian 
sexual backwardness, [Israel] also denies the impact of colonial occupation on the 
degradation and containment of Palestinian cultural norms and values. Pinkwashing 
harnesses global gays as a new source of affiliation, recruiting liberal gays into a dirty 
bargaining of their own safety against the oppression of Palestinians, now perforce 
rebranded as ‘gay unfriendly.’”51 Although the Israeli nation-state has been advancing 
such “pro-gay” messaging for years with the backing of the US, queer-defensibility as a 
budding strategy within the US nation-state’s own warmongering platform has curiously 
materialized only after the legalization of same-sex marriage. Indeed, this revelation 
further evidences the critical role that “legalizing queerness”—with all its respectable 
bells and whistles attached—has played in mobilizing emergent nationalist mythologies 
towards hawkish recourse globally. 
Before the queer defense came into fruition, the enforcement of American 
exceptionalism in the Muslim world manifested in efforts to restore “gender equality,” 
centering the liberation of Muslim women from the oppression of Muslim men and, for 
all intents and purposes, Islam altogether. After President George W. Bush launched the 
War on Terror on October 7, 2001, First Lady Laura Bush became the quintessential 
spokesperson for promoting the liberation of the Afghan woman under the Taliban. 
Indeed, the First Lady (alongside her husband) played a decisive role in explicitly linking 
“feminism” to the US military bombardment of Afghanistan, famously pronouncing “the 
fight against terrorism [as] also a fight for the rights and dignity of women” in a radio 
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address to the nation.52  The Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF)—a nongovernmental 
organization committed to “Stopping Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan,”53 among other 
issues—echoed the First Lady’s words and promoted the war as a “benevolent” cause 
against the gender-segregated conditions in Afghanistan, rallying policymakers and the 
American public around the “equitable” principles driving US intervention. The FMF’s 
seemingly admirable campaign centered on dislodging the authority of the Taliban, 
inserting a democratic government composed of Afghan women, providing emergency 
humanitarian assistance, and aiding in the reconstruction of the economy and 
infrastructure of Afghanistan.   
The American public’s backing of the war in Afghanistan was in large part 
supported by this “emancipatory” rhetoric. However women’s studies scholar Ann Russo 
interrupts this hegemonic US-savior discourse by highlighting the extent to which these 
“humanitarian” objectives served to reinforce notions of US superiority and 
“benevolence” in order to rationalize military control and intervention. In her critical 
analysis of the Foundation, she writes the following: 
The FMF campaign assumes ‘Western’ superiority through its ahistorical and Orientalist 
focus on ‘the veil’ and gender segregation as symbolic of women’s oppression and its 
implicit assumption that the US embodies gender equality and women’s human rights. 
This Orientalist logic constructs an absolute difference between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’/ 
‘self’ and ‘other’. It does so by erasing the history and politics of Afghanistan and by 
projecting a cultural barbarity in need of a civilizing mission. The assumption of 
superiority and benevolence is possible because the FMF evades its own implication in 
the politics of the region and condones the terms of imperialism – the right to control, the 
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right to invade and the right to occupy under the guise of ‘liberating’ women and creating 
‘gender equality’ resonant with so-called Western standards.54 
 
Russo’s reflections situate the “equitable” agenda of the Feminist Majority Foundation 
and First Lady Laura Bush within the larger Western imperialist and hegemonic 
framework. She challenges these efforts to defend US militarization as exercises in 
“benevolence,” calling attention to their critical role in reifying Western dominance over 
cultural and political autonomies of peoples abroad—particularly those in the 
predominantly Muslim and Arab countries of the “Orient.” Accordingly, the “liberation 
of the Afghan woman” reveals itself as yet another manufactured alibi in the furtherance 
of US geopolitical hegemony. 
Indeed, this protectionist discourse reminds us of the substantial role that moral-
politicking has played in activating the massive US war-machine as well as of the 
strength with which it resonates today. It is the state’s capacity to project a “moral cause” 
onto the conflict that sustains the War on Terror, insofar as the moral politics of the 
moment remain relevant to the American public. Since its original launch fifteen years 
ago, the story of the War on Terror continues to evolve and re-introduce itself according 
to the authoritative forces of contemporary US politics; we have watched its agenda 
transform from “protecting the Afghan woman” in 2001 to “protecting the American 
queer” in 2016, all the while holding our breath on the defensibility of the war itself. 
These changes expose the extent to which the terms of the War on Terror remain 
malleable and relevant in accordance with shifting political tones on US soil, enabling the 
conflict to persist with indefinite reach.     
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IV. Conclusion: The Stakes of the War on Terror Story  
 
 The convergence of the politics of marriage equality and the aging War on Terror 
reflects the sheer stamina of contemporary American warfare ideology. The invocation of 
queer-defensibility as fodder for the already-immense counterterror state is revealing in 
two fundamental ways: on the one hand, it exposes a reimagined nation-state in which 
privileged queer folks now find home and security, and on the other, it demonstrates the 
tenacity of the War on Terror and its ability to persevere simply by reimagining the 
threats that are posed against the nation-state. Between Congress’ declaration of war on 
September 14, 200155 and the signing of the Patriot Act into law on October 21, 200156, 
the US government became equipped with an unprecedented degree of military and 
surveillance authority in the name of national security. Indeed, when President Bush 
announced “our War on Terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there; it will not 
end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated,”57 
he effectively opened the door for a counterterror campaign whose unforeseeably 
immense capacities would have surprised perhaps even him. National imagination has 
played a key role in defining the parameters of the conflict; as Joseph Masco describes, 
“The innovation of the War on Terror is that it formally rejects deterrence, with its focus 
on global stability, as an objective in favor of preemption—an unending manipulation of 
the future for national advantage.”58 Rooted in the provocation of fear and the boundless 
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imagined possibilities of existential threat to the union, the War on Terror prospers in its 
ability to morph and seemingly respond to national sentiment, wherever it lands at any 
given moment. Whether or not the infrastructures of the War on Terror are actually 
activated in the name of protecting queer folks from “Islamic terrorism” is beside the 
point. It is of more immediate concern that those innocent Muslim and Arab communities 
across the Middle East, South Asia, and the Western world—which since 9/11 have 
become the sites of ritualized surveillance, scrutiny, and violence under the pretense of 
“national security” and the promotion of “Western” values—become centered in 
mainstream conceptions of the War on Terror as well as the rhetorical ploys and moral-
politicking that continue to sustain it.  
